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Highlights 
- The public reporting of individual surgeon outcomes in the England is unprecendeted in scope 
- As yet, there is insufficient evidence of broad-scale public reporting of surgeon outcomes to be an incentive to improve quality 
- Some studies suggest adverse patient selection after the introduction of public reporting of surgeon outcomes 
- Public reporting of surgeon outcomes is often legitimized as empowering patients, but the data uptake in terms of discussions with 
patients is low 
- Public reporting is most likely an incentive for low performing surgeons  
- A number of key criteria need to be satisfied for public reporting of surgeon outcomes to be effective 
Abstract  
 
Background: Public reporting of surgeon outcomes has become a key strategy in the English NHS to ensure accountability and improve the 
quality of care. Much of the evidence that supported the design of the strategy originates from the USA. This report aims to assess how the 
evidence on public reporting could be harnessed for cross-country translation of this health system strategy; in particular, to gauge the 
expected results of the UK surgeon outcome initiative and to propose criteria that elucidate that prerequisites and factors that are needed to 
public reporting effective.  
 
Methods: A systematic search of academic databases was followed by snowballing from the reference lists. Only peer-reviewed articles and 
primary studies were included.  
 
Results:  25 studies from the USA (n=22) and the UK (n=3) were included. Suggestive evidence of a negative effect on access to surgery was 
found for high-risk patients and non-whites; one survey indicated presence of gaming. There was anecdotal evidence of quality improvement 
measures adopted by low-rated hospitals in New York. Most studies reported only on the effectiveness of public reporting, rather than 
addressing how effects accrue. This limits cross-country transferability of policy lessons. Based on our analysis, we propose factors impacting 
on the transferability of the evidence underlying the public reporting of surgeon outcomes, which may inform the adoption of this strategy in 
other health systems. 
 
Conclusions: There is some evidence that public reporting can be an incentive for low performing surgeons to improve quality. Negative 
incentive on patient selection as suggested in the USA have not yet been observed in the UK. 
 
 
Introduction  
 
In the UK, an ambitious public reporting (PR) programme has been implemented in the last few years, steered by various high profile scandals 
about quality care outcomes [1,2]. In December 2012, NHS England published its 2013/14 planning guidance specifying - amongst other - the 
aim to improve patient care through better commissioning of services, and to support patients in making informed choices, implemented via 
public reporting of (initially) ten specialities (better known as ‘Offer 2’) [3]. Today, PR is seen as a central tool for quality improvement and since 
2013 individual surgeons’ outcomes are made public via the patient portal ‘NHS choices’ [4]. Data has been published for more than 5000 
consultant surgeons in 12 specialties (Adult cardiac surgery, Bariatric surgery, Colorectal surgery, Endocrine and thyroid surgery, Head and 
neck cancer surgery, Interventional cardiology, Lung cancer, Neurosurgery, Orthopedic surgery and Upper gastro-intestinal surgery). Data 
sources and outcome measures vary among specialties, but all include mortality rates (MR) of patients.  
The idea to publicly report provider outcomes in order to ensure and improve quality is not new. Nearly 30 years ago, the Healthcare Financing 
Authority (HCFA) published annual mortality rates of Medicare patients in hospitals in the USA in 1987. Shortly after that, in 1989, the most 
studied PR scheme, the New York Cardiac Surgery Reporting System (CSRS) was initiated. In New York State, hospitals needed to obtain a 
certificate in order to offer cardiac surgery, and mandatory PR outcomes have been enforced since 1991. From 1989 to 1992 mortality rates 
dropped from 3.5% to 2.8% (41% decrease of risk-adjusted in-hospital mortality) [5], while nationally it only decreased 18% between 1987 to 
1990 (30-day MR). In the 1990s, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts also started surgery-focused PR.  
Today, PR is a widespread tool to measure and advertise the quality of nursing homes, hospitals and healthcare-maintenance-organisations 
(HMOs) [6]. While in the English NHS surgeon outcomes were available before, they were not specifically released to the patients (but reported 
embedded on hospital web sites), not systematically reported in a common, standardized platform and not covering the wide range of 
specialities involved now. Thus, the recent publication of surgeon outcomes has generated substantial debate in academia and policy since its 
publication on NHS Choices in 2013/2014.  
 
The assumption is that public reporting unfolds its effects via a range of pathways [7, 8]. Generally, a distinction is made between pathways 
referring to the principle-agent-relationship where patients are empowered by public reporting to make better choices, or pathways related to 
competition theory, whereas providers would improve outcomes to compete for patients. In practice, there are alternative mechanisms through 
which public reporting could affect outcomes. Werner [8] outlines 4 possible mechanisms: 1. patients might choose high-quality providers; 2. 
GPs might refer to high-quality providers; 3. Purchasers select high-quality providers; 4. Providers themselves react in response to PR. In terms 
of patient choice, a growing body of evidence shows that PR of outcomes only have a limited impact: Patients have difficulties understanding 
comparative PR data, especially if different measures are contradicting [9, 10]. Other studies have found that consumers might value own 
experience or recommendation from family and friends more than comparative outcomes information [11]. In one study, fewer than 10% of  
patients looked at performance data [12]; in another, only 12% of patients who had undergone Coronary Artery Bypass Graft (CABG) surgery in 
NY knew about PR and fewer than 1% were able to state the performance of their surgeon correctly [13]. In terms of GPs referral to high quality 
providers, the proposition is that they would act as agents for their clients, but in fact evidence suggests that GPs also value informal sources of 
quality information more than performance ratings [14]. There is insufficient evidence on purchasing models for surgeon outcomes, even 
though this is an area of increasing importance as many health systems start to focus on purchasing for value rather than services. Research 
suggests that a large part of the impact of PR is amongst providers themselves [15-19].  
 
There is a growing body of evidence about what the impacts of PR might be. Yet, a large volume of previous research on public disclosure 
focused at the hospital level, rather than individual surgeon level, and didn’t sufficiently focus on the question by way of which mechanisms PR 
influences quality and which health system structures, governance arrangements and, broadly, prerequisites need to be in place for public 
reporting to be effective. However, this very question is a key to understanding the potential effects of public reporting and assessing whether 
research evidence stemming from one health system can be applied to another (here: the NHS in the UK). 
  
The aims of this review are therefore to assess the evidence on whether and how public reporting of outcomes can be an incentive for 
surgeons to improve quality. Furthermore, we investigate whether the literature contains evidence regarding two key tenets of the UK surgeon-
level outcomes public reporting initiative: (i) surgeons discussing their outcomes with patients, GPs, CCGs or managers in order to improve the 
quality of care (as indicated in the NHS planning document “Offer 2”), or (ii) public reporting leading to adverse patient selection, as feared by 
the surgical specialties [20]. We then (iii) discuss the findings and consider the potential impact of the current UK surgeon level reporting 
initiative and (iv) propose some key lessons and contextual factors that should be considered by other countries that are in the process of 
devising a surgeon level public disclosure strategy.  
Methods 
We gathered and assessed the literature on public reporting of surgeon outcomes, and synthesised the effects and mechanisms from this 
literature. Methods used to collect and analyse the information contributing to this review followed the PICO framework [21], PRISMA statement 
[22] and Hawker et al [23] tool for quality assessment of the retrieved papers. 
Search strategy 
Translating the question into search terms was informed by the PICO framework that has been recommended for literature review about clinical 
questions [21]. The framework includes the patient target group (P) , intervention (I), comparison group (C) and outcome (O). For the purpose 
of this review, a comparison group was not included into the search terms. 
Target population were individual surgeons or surgery departments. To extend the number of potential hits, all known US states with a PR 
system or known USA-wide PR systems were included, as they might be mentioned in the title rather than “surgeon”. This approach was 
informed by the review by Totten et. al on a related topic [24]. In this way, all present literature, also from outside the USA, could be included.  
As PR was the intervention, all synonyms for PR or outcomes were included in the search. As outcomes, all terms referring to consequences 
and assessment were included (see Appendix A). 
Starting from these initial search terms, related Emtree and MESH terms were compiled and linked using Bolean operators: search terms were 
linked with OR and concepts with AND. The search was conducted on 15.07.2015 (Appendix B). The search was conducted in Medline, 
EconLit and Embase. The search was limited to all studies published after 1980, as the first PR initiative started in 1989. Further limits were 
human and English language. Due to the number of results, the search was further limited in Medline and Embase to title and abstracts. For the 
search in EconLit, only 3 concepts were applied and no limits, due to the much smaller number of results than in Medline and Embase. 
Study selection 
The initial results were screened according to their title and potential relevance to PR. In a second step the abstracts were considered. Of the 
remaining studies, the full text was retrieved if possible and pre-defined inclusion and exclusion criteria applied (Table 1). To make sure all 
relevant studies would be included, even if not found in the systematic search, reference lists of included studies were perused to find further 
relevant studies (snowballing). For the purpose of this review, only primary studies were considered. Literature reviews were excluded, but the 
reference lists of systematic reviews were used to further check that no relevant study was left out. To ensure the quality of the review, only 
peer-reviewed articles were included. 
Table 1: Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
Quality assessment 
Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care Group (EPOC) provides detailed guidelines on how to assess the quality of studies, 
mostly clinical trials [25]. Due to the diverse nature of the studies included, the tool was found unfit to assess the quality of qualitative studies. 
To do justice to the different types of studies, a checklist developed by Hawker et al [23,26] was used, which can be applied to studies with 
qualitative and quantitative methods. It has 9 categories (abstract, introduction, methods, sampling, results, bias, analysis, transferability and 
implications) that can be rated with 1 to 4 points in their quality and added up to a cumulative score between 9 and 36. The results can be seen 
in Appendix C.  
Data extraction 
Again in accordance with Cochrane recommendations, the Cochrane data extraction worksheet [25] was adapted to fit the question and scope 
of this review. A meta-analysis of the study data was not attempted due to the various study designs and backgrounds. 
Results 
Studies found and evaluated 
The database search led to initially 710 publications being found, of which 663 remained after exclusion of duplicates. After screening titles, 
112 studies were identified as potentially relevant, of which 50 were chosen for full text reading after reviewing abstracts. 10 of these were 
included in the review. The screening of the reference list resulted into another 10 studies being located. Thus, in total, 25 studies were 
included into the review. 
 
Figure 1: Flow chart of study selection process 
 
Of the 25 studies identified, 8 had a survey or interview design, 8 an interrupted time series or difference-in differences approach, one case 
study, a case control Study, 5 cohort studies and 2 with a before-after design. 22 studies were from the USA and 3 from the UK. The period of 
analysis covered 1987 until 2012.  
Key themes in the literature  
The most frequent issue of PR addressed in the literature is the potential detrimental effect of PR on access to surgery – the assumption that 
surgeons might reject high risk patients because of the fear of becoming an outlier in the mortality statistics. All other themes were addressed 
far less commonly, particularly those related to the assumptions of “Offer 2”, namely that patients use the information to choose a surgeon or 
that GPs and purchasers use the reports to contract surgeons. Likewise, we didn´t find studies that describe the consequences of patients 
confronting the hospital/surgeon and requesting, because of their outcomes, a reassignment. Table 2  provides an overview on the studies 
included and on the outcomes of interest (Table 2). 
Table 2: Included studies and outcomes of interest 
Adverse patient selection was the most frequently studied outcome of public reports. Of the studies included in this review, 5 reported a positive 
or no effect on access to surgery, one a transient effect. The majority of the studies (n=14) however reported a negative effect on patient 
selection, suggesting that surgeons were less likely to accept high risk patients after the introduction of public reporting.  
 
Table 3 summarizes the result of the studies on adverse selection as a consequence of public reporting of surgeon outcomes (Table 3). 
 
Adverse selection as a potential consequence of public reporting 
 
Of the studies addressing adverse selection, quality and strength of evidence varied considerably: For example, Hannan et al [27] reported a 
minor effect of PR, with 40% of NY cardiologists influenced by PR, but only 6% claiming to be strongly influenced. Narins et al [28] and 
Schneider et al [29] both reported a majority of cardiac surgeons being less likely to accept a high risk patient. Hannan et al [30] and Glance et 
al [31] found in a sample of 31 hospitals and 87 surgeons that high risk patients were less likely operated on by surgeons with high 
performance. This is consistent with the findings of Dranove et al [32], we found that the relative illness severity among AMI patients in NY and 
Pennsylvania declined, Moscucci et al [33] who detected a decline in the rates of comorbidities in AMI patients, while Omoigui found that 
patients referred from NY to Ohio were sicker than other referrals or patients from Ohio itself. Glance et al Hannan et al and Peterson et al on 
the other hand could not identify such effects in their studies [30, 31, 34].  
Results from California are mixed: Li et al [35] and Romano et al [36] found no evidence of risk selection when they looked at patient case mix, 
but argue that high-mortality hosptals might have avoided high-risk patients. Moreover, Werner et al [37] found a transient negative effect on 
access to CABG surgery for African American patients, as they were less likely to receive CABG surgery. In the consecutive year (1996), 
Mukamel et al [38] found that non-whites are more likely to receive surgery from low-quality surgeons. Overall, although study results are 
contradictory in details, there was some evidence that PR reduced access to surgery for very sick patients and patients from different ethnic 
backgrounds. 
However, adverse selection is a topic that is difficult to assess, prone to a number of biases, and vulnerable to the availability of high quality 
data. Maythams et al study [39] suffered from potential responder bias due to low response rate of 50%, and, generally, the surveys conducted 
represent weaker evidence due to social acceptability bias. Narins et al [40] reported that 88% agreed or strongly agreed that “physicians may 
report higher risk conditions to improve their outcomes”, while 57% of respondants in Brown´s et al  study felt that surgeons and hospitals can 
manipulate the data [41]. Further, studies fail to clearly attribute exposure or provide control groups [42], suffer from missing data [43] or were 
conducted based on patient [44] or provider subgroups [45]. Moreover, even if adverse selection took place, this may not necessarily suggest 
lower quality of care: It has been suggested that the less invasive percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI) might be a substitute treatment for 
CABG patients being considered too sick to be offered surgery. Dranove et al [32] looked at PCI as a substitute for CABG in NY, where only 
CABG outcomes were reported. They also found that percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA) procedure numbers decreased 
and that hospitals might have taken general measures to avoid high risk patients. Their dataset was, however, restricted to Medicare claims. 
Consequently, because of the diverse nature of study designs applied, systems and patient groups studied, the evidence of consequences of 
public reporting is limited and its impact on quality of care outcomes needs to be interpreted with great caution.  
 
Table 3: Patient selection and access to care (continued on next page) 
 
Table 4: Patient selection and access to care (continued) 
 
Use of data by providers to improve quality of care 
A key claim of “Offer 2” is that public reports could be used by the public to choose a provider, by GPs to inform referrals and by commissioners 
to contract for outcomes. This review found limited evidence for such interactions in health systems with a history of surgeon reporting. Two 
surveys assessed the usage of the data in interactions between surgeons and patients. Burack et al found that 29% discussed the dataless 
than weekly with their patients and 44% frequently (less than weekly) with colleagues [46]. Moreover, the study suggests that understanding of 
the methods underlying the published outcomes was limited amongst the surgeons. In the study by Hannan et al [47], 22% agreed that they 
routinely discussed the information in the report with their patients. Based on the literature, only a minority of surgeons seem to discuss their 
outcomes with patients on a regular basis. It has to be taken into account that all these studies were surveys from the USA; there was no data 
available yet from UK since the introduction of “Offer 2”. However, investigations and organizational changes amongst hospitals with suspicious 
surgeon outcomes could be a relevant implication of public reporting. Dziuban [48] and Chassin [49] interviewed staff from hospitals which were 
published as having high mortality rates. All hospitals  were subjected to special measures and required to undergo a case review. In two cases 
a lack of dedicated cardiac surgery support staff was identified, the other two identified the approach to the treatment of emergency cases as 
the cause of the high mortality rate. Strikingly, Dziuban reported an increased team cooperation as one of the salient positive outcomes of the 
investigation into the high mortality rate. The reports demonstrate that the reasons for high MRs are complex and may not only be attributable 
to the surgeons themselves. 
A proposition put forward by the proponents of public reporting is that learning about their performance compared to peers might lead to 
increased intrinsic motivation of surgeons to perform better as opposed to extrinsic motivation due to remuneration. We did not find research to 
support this proposition. Economic models exist to demonstrate the influence of intrinsic motivation on surgeon performance [50], however, 
such models rely on a large number of assumptions. A more pertinent implication of surgeon reports might be that low-performing surgeons 
cease practicing. Jha et al [51] and Hannans et al [47] studies indicate that a larger percentage of bottom quartile surgeons stopped practice in 
NY than top quartile. Similarly, in Hannans study, the decline in mortality rate was partly attributable to low-volume surgeons with high mortality 
rate that ceased to practice [47].   
Discussion 
 
The aim of this study was to assess the international evidence on public reporting with a special focus on the two contrasting theses 
surrounding the introduction of the UK surgeon-level outcomes public reporting initiative: improved quality through better reflection on outcomes 
by patients, GPs, CCGs or managers and adverse consequences of public reporting on patient selection  
We found a substantial literature assessing potential and observed adverse consequences of public reporting and less literature addressing the 
mechanisms that translate public reporting into quality improvement initiatives, with the largest effects to be expected amongst the lowest 
performing providers. The findings need to be interpreted with great caution. The variety of methodological approaches (design with/without 
control group or surveys with risk of bias) make it difficult to reach a final conclusion on the presence and extent of adverse selection of patients 
according to risk [8]. Questions have also been raised concerning the reliability of underlying data sources, the extent and impact of missing 
data, the comparability of clinical and administrative sources, and variations in approaches to coding the data. Moreover, the mortality risk of a 
patient is influenced by the patient (e.g severity of illness or comorbidities) as well as the treatment. Since the beginning of PR, the 
appropriateness of the risk-adjustment procedures has been questioned and criticized. The NYCS has updated their risk-adjustment several 
times [52, 53] but research suggests that different methods of risk adjustments will lead to different results [54, 55].  
More fundamentally, however, is the question to what extent the literature (mostly derived from the experience of public reporting of cardiac 
surgeon outcomes in NY state) supports a generalizability of the findings to the UK context. In the US healthcare system with its many health 
insurances and where surgeons are not necessarily employed by a hospital [56], PR might offer a stronger incentive for patient risk selection 
than in the UK, where surgeons are less dependent on the market. Thus, this evidence might not be applicable to the UK NHS (the only UK 
study about patient access to care could not found evidence of gaming). In order to assess the transferability of the resuls, the processes 
through which public reporting should lead to the desired effect will be elucidated in more detail below. Subsequently we will present some 
factors that policy makers may consider when devising a surgeon outcome initiative in their own country.  
Whether public reporting can be an incentive for quality improvement can not be easily answered. From a behavioural economics perspective, 
PR data can be seen as a `nudge`[57], that means providing feedback to intrinsically motivated surgeons, who will then act accordingly and try 
to improve [58]. Kolstad´s study showed a higher impact f intrinsic motivation on NY surgeons’ quality improvement than their revenue had [50]. 
In fact surgeons were willing to forego parts of their revenue to improve quality. An alternative behavioral economics mechanism for public 
reporting to drive quality improvement is via cognitive bias that can come into play leading individuals to fear deviating from accepted standards 
more than appreciating the potential to improve their care [59]. The prospect of being ´named & shamed´ might lead surgeons to change their 
choice of patients in order to avoid becoming an outlier, as discussed above. According to Kolstad, motivation is highest when expected and 
observed performance are far apart, whether better or worse than expected, yet the UK PR data as presented online mainly distinguishes 
between `OK´ performance and ´negative outlier´. As the media focuses on the negative outliers, this is a plausible mechanism for PR 
functioning. Chassin showed that low performers are more likely to leave the practice, so the PR might indeed have had an effect [49].  
Transparency and consumer choice are also often mentioned as reasons to justify PR efforts [6]. Some doctors go as far as claiming that 
consent to a procedure can only be given, and be valid, if the patient is aware of the surgeon’s performance [60]. Survey results from the USA 
suggest that mortality data is not often discussed between doctors and patients. This finding is in line with other research that shows that 
patients found it difficult to understand outcome measures and value more highly recommendations from family and friends [10]. In the UK, 
where patients traditionally have less choice, data usage might be even less significant and, should this be the case, PR a weaker incentive.  
An assessment of whether public disclosure of surgeon outcomes can be translated to other settings also needs to consider the health care 
delivery system in which the surgeon operates. In this sense, public reporting can be considered as a complex improvement intervention of 
which the active ingredient is not well understood. For example, case studies of US hospitals that faced high MR show evidence that the 
published outcomes are rarely attributable to the surgeon alone. Organisational structures and a lack of dedicated staff and procedures can 
also have a large impact on patient outcomes [61]. Similarly, the three surgeons (out of more than 5000) who were found to be negative outliers 
in the UK so far faced an individual review as well as a review of their whole unit [62]. Organizational measures were taken rather than re-
training of the surgeon [63-65]. On the other hand, a clear accountability can also be considered as a requirement to improve team efforts [66].  
The absence of controlled studies means that is difficul to separate the effect of public reporting from other strategies. There is also evidence 
that non-PR feedback can improve quality as well: in New England outcomes feedback, hospital visits and training in quality improvement were 
combined. The mortality rate went down as various measures were taken at the hospital level– multiprofessional reviews on clinical processes, 
protocol implementation, reviews of deaths, hiring dedicated cardiac surgery staff, training and implementation of checklists [67]. This then also 
raises the question of whether an individual surgeon represents the right unit of analysis. In the USA, where surgeons might not be employed 
by the hospital, and in cardiac surgery where procedure volume is high, the answer might be different from in the UK, and for a different 
procedure (say, upper gastro-intestinal surgery, with its much lower caseload per surgeon). Whether the statistical power is sufficient to detect 
variations in quality outcomes is an issue we have raised previously, and a prerequisite for public reports to unfold their effects [68]. This 
depends mostly on the expected outcome, the volume of cases per surgeon and the number of surgeons performing the operation. These 
seemingly technical details are a good example to illustrate the limitations of transferring research evidence from one setting to another. 
Ideally, in order to appraise research evidence to support translating a health system strategy from one setting to another one should a-priori 
consider the key factors that determine the translation. At the conceptual level (as reflected in the “generic quality criteria for cross-country 
comparisons of health systems and policies”), this implies appropriate use of theory, explicit selection of country comparator, rigour in the 
comparison design, attention to the complexity of the cross-national comparison, rigour of the research method and a clear contribution of 
knowledge for both theory development and policy learning [69]. In the contect of public reporting of surgeon outcomes, we have outlined in this 
review a wide range of the factors underlying the effectiveness of public reporting, a diverse set of theories to postulate the expected results 
and to formulate the implicit causal pathways, all of which will determine to what extent the published evidence is appropriate to justify the 
proposed health system strategy, in this case the formulation of “Offer 2”.  
Based on the published literature and our analysis presented here, we suggest specific criteria for cross-country learning from public reporting 
initiatives, which may support other countries to assess the potential impact of public reporting of surgeon outcomes and to devising a public 
reporting strategy. These criteria cover health system factors, surgeon factors, data related factors, patient factors, and organizational factors 
(Textbox 1).  
 
Textbox 1: Factors impacting on the transferability of the evidence underlying the public reporting of surgeon outcomes 
Generic health system factors: 
- Coverage and access: do all patients have equal access to the procedure? 
- Choice: do patients have a choice of the provider (hospital, surgeon) 
- Existing public reporting system: has some data (say hospital level outcomes) already been 
puiblished? 
- What is the role of the GP in the referral system (gatekeeping, direct referral) and are there 
other means of patient referral or relevance in the context of public reporting? 
- Purchasing mechanisms: how are services contracted for – based on volume or based on 
outcomes 
- Number of surgeons conducting the procedure: how many surgeons care conducting the 
operation in the health system 
- How will the results be published: is there a single entry portal? 
- Does the single entry portal contain patient education material beyond the outcome data? 
Surgeon factors: 
- Employed or independent: are surgeons on a fixed-appointment with a hospital or clinic, or do 
they freely operate in different organizations 
- Competition: do surgeons compete for patients? 
- Type and volume of procedures covered: which procedure should be publicly reported? 
Depending on the case volume and accountability there will be major implications for the 
public reporting initiative 
Data related factors: 
- Is quality data available (clinical registry or high quality administrative data)? 
- Have appropriate risk adjustment mechanisms for the procedure been developed? 
- What is the median delay from procedure to registration to analysis to public report? 
Patient factors: 
- Does the entire population have easy access to the Internet? 
- How is the health literacy level amongst the target population? 
- Are there major regional variations in access surgery (limiting patient choice)? 
Organizational and professional: 
- Do hospitals/clinics have the capacity for team and hospital level discussions to learn from 
outlying performers? 
- Is there a national agency in charge of liaising with low performers to ensure that appropriate 
investigations, where appropriate, are initiated? 
 
 
Limitations  
This review has several limitations. Due to the diverse range of studies and outcomes included, a meta-analysis of the could not be conducted. 
Some studies were not included due to lack of access, or due to not being published in a peer-reviewed journal. The studies included showed 
varying quality. No study addressed the the question of this review entirely, so that different pieces of information had to be put together and 
evaluated in relation to each other. Public reporting in the literature so far has mostly addressed mortality outcomes. The public reporting 
mechanisms will be the same for other outcomes, yet the effectiveness of mechanisms might differ. For example, patient reported outcomes 
might offer better metric properties (in the context of surgeons outocomes, where denominators are small) and might also lead for a more 
active engagement of patients [68]. Finally, most studies (n=22) found were from the USA with limited applicability to a UK context, therefore, 
we have emphasized the transferability of the results to different health system contexts.. 
Conclusions  
PR represents a well established but not yet fully understood approach to improving quality of healthcare. As most research on PR is from a US 
context, the findings can’t easily be transferred to the potential use by GPs and clinical commissioning groups in the NHS (or health care 
providers and purchasing agencies in different health systems). Therefore, if public reporting is introduced at population level, access to 
surgery and potential negative effects (adverse selection) should be monitored. Policy makers devising a strategy to publish surgeon outcomes 
in their own health systems may benefit from contemplating the factors presented here that address the transferability of the evidence 
underlying the public reporting of surgeon outcomes and specifically, whether prevailing health system conditions are supportive of such a 
strategy. 
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Figure 1: Flow chart of study selection process 
  
Table 5: Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
Inclusion criteria Exclusion criteria 
- primary studies 
- all clinical areas 
- focus on supply side (healthcare providers) 
- main focus on surgery, either individual 
surgeons or surgery departments 
- mandatory PR or PR in general 
- information about possible consequences of 
PR, the how? 
- peer reviewed journals 
- full text available 
- (systematic) Literature reviews 
- consumer ratings only (see definition of 
outcome) 
- focus on demand side 
- (duplication of findings in revision  phase of 
manuscript preparation) 
 
Table 6: Included studies and outcomes of interest 
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Apolito et al. 2008 
USA, 
NY 
sno CC x 
         
34 
Bridgewater et 
al. 
2007 UK sno IST x 
         
35 
Burack et al. 1999 
USA, 
NY 
sno Q x 
   
x 
     
31 
Chassin et al. 2002 
USA, 
NY 
sys Q 
      
x 
   
19 
Dranove et al. 2003 
USA, 
NY 
sys DID x x 
        
28 
Dziuban et al. 1994 USA, sno C 
      
x 
   
23 
NY 
Glance et al. 2007 
USA;, 
NY 
sno C x 
         
35 
Hannan et al. 1995 
USA, 
NY 
sno C 
        
x x 34 
Hannan et al. 1997 
USA; 
NY 
sno C x 
         
34 
Hannan et al. 1997 
USA, 
NY 
sys Q x 
   
x 
     
30 
Jha et.al. 2006 
USA, 
NY 
sys Q 
         
x 25 
Joynt et.a. 2012 
USA, 
NY 
Mass 
Penn 
sno 
ITS/
DID 
x 
         
34 
Khan et.al. 2007 UK sys ITS 
   
x 
      
31 
Kolstad 2013 
USA, 
Penn 
sys ITS 
       
x 
  
29 
Li et al. 2009 
USA, 
Cal 
sno BA x 
         
34 
Maytham 2010 UK sys Q x 
   
(x) 
     
29 
Moscucci et al. 2005 
USA, 
NY 
sno C x 
         
26 
Mukamel 2006 
USA, 
NY 
sys C x 
         
26 
Narins et.at. 2005 
USA; 
NY 
sys Q x 
 
x 
       
29 
Omoigui et.at. 1996 
USA; 
Ohio 
sno 
ITS/
CBA 
x 
         
33 
Peterson et. al. 1998 
USA; 
NY 
sno ITS x 
         
27 
Romano et al. 2011 
USA, 
Cal 
sno BA x 
         
33 
Schneider et.al. 1996 
USA; 
Penn 
sno Q x 
         
32 
Sherman et.al. 2013 USA sys Q x 
  
x 
      
31 
Werner et.al. 2005 
USA; 
NY 
sys 
ITS/
DID 
x 
         
32 
NY=New York; Penn=Pennsylvania; Mass=Massachusetts; sno= snowballing; sys=systematic review; ITS=Interrupted time 
series; Q=survey or interview; C=cohort study; CC=case-control study; DID=Difference-in-Difference Analysis; CBA= Controlled 
before-after study; CR= case report; BA=Before-after design 
 
 
Table 7: Patient selection and access to care (continued on next page) 
Author  Apolito et al. Bridgewater 
et al.  
Burack et al. Dranove et al.  Glance et al.  Hannan, Siu, 
et al 
Hannan, 
Stone et al. 
Joynt Kolstad Li et al. 
year 2008 2007 1999 2003 2007 1997 1997 2012 2013 2009 
country USA, NY UK USA, NY USA, NY USA, NY USA, NY USA, NY USA, NY + 
Mass + Penn 
USA, Penn  USA, Cal 
study type CC ITS Q DID C C Q ITS/DID ITS BA 
level  Pat Hosp  Sur Hosp, Pat Pat Sur Sur Pat Sur Pat 
results ↓rates of 
coronary 
angiography 
for patients 
with shock 
and acute MI; 
↑waiting 
times CABG.  
↑ Mortality 
among NY 
patiens who 
were not 
revascularized 
↑ numbers 
and 
percentages 
of low, high 
and very high 
risk patients 
significantly 
increased 
70% 
reported no 
change in 
practice, but 
64% claimed 
to have 
refused at 
least one 
CABG patient 
because of 
PR. More 
high risk 
patients 
were refused 
CABG 
surgery than 
surgery for 
aortic 
dissection, 
which is not 
publicly 
reported. 
↓ relative 
illness 
severity 
among PR 
patients, as 
well as ↓ in 
the within- 
hospital 
heterogeneity 
of AMI 
patients. ↑ 
high risk 
patiens 
attending 
teaching 
hospitals. 
↑Waiting 
times for 
CABG and 
PCI. Increased 
expenditures 
for AMI and 
CABG 
patients. 
High risk 
CABG 
patients 
were found 
to be more 
likely to 
recieve 
surgery from 
a high quality 
surgeon 
no sign of 
limited 
access to 
surgery or 
gaming 
38% NY 
cardiologists 
stated the 
report had 
an influence 
on their 
referral 
practice, but 
only 6% said 
they were 
very much 
influenced by 
the reports 
↓ likely to get 
PCI with acute 
MI, especially 
with ST-
elevated MI 
or cardiogenic 
shock or 
cardiac arrest. 
↔ overall 
mortality in 
reporting and 
non-reporting 
states. In 
Massachusets, 
odds of 
recieving PCI 
↓ after PR 
had begun. 
Komplex 
economic 
model, in 
which there 
was a minor 
effect of low-
performing 
surgeons to 
avoid high-
risk patients 
but this only 
accounted 
for 5% of the 
imporvement 
of quality. 
27% less 
patients 
underwent 
CABG in 2006 
than 2003; 
the case mix 
stayed 
unchanged 
however. 
Observed MR 
was lower in 
the high-risk 
quartiles in 
2006 than 
2003. All 4 
outlier 
surgeons of 
2006 met the 
expected MR 
in 2006. 
effect --- + - --- + 0 - -- - 0 
Table 8: Patient selection and access to care (continued) 
Author  Maytham Moscucci et 
al.  
Mukamel et 
al. 
Narins et.at. Omoigui 
et.at. 
Peterson et. 
al. 
Romano et 
al. 
Schneider 
et.al. 
Sherman 
et.al. 
Werner 
et.al.  
year 2010 2005 2006 2005 1996 1998 2011 1996 2013 2005 
country UK USA, NY USA, NY USA, NY USA, Ohio USA, NY USA, Cal USA, Penn USA, IL USA, NY 
study type Q C C Q ITS/CBA IST BA Q Q ITS/DID 
level  Sur Pat Pat Sur Pat Pat Pat Sur Sur Pat 
results ↓ surgeons 
claiming they 
will avoid 
high-risk 
patients, 
↑claiming 
they will not 
change 
practice, ↑ 
thinking PR 
will improve 
outcomes  
↓ patiens 
with AMI and 
cardiogenic 
shock 
underwent 
PCI, ↓ rates 
of 
comorbidities. 
Unadjusted 
MR ↓ but 
after 
adjustment 
the difference  
not significant 
any more. 
whites were 
more likely 
to have 
access to 
low-RAMR 
surgeons. 
Level of 
access also 
dependent 
on health 
insurance 
type (for 
HMO 
patients 
worse than 
for FFS 
patients) 
> 79% agreed 
that 1) 
knowledge of 
RAMR PR 
influenced 
decision to 
perform 
angioplasy, 
2) patients 
might not get 
it due to PR 
RAMR; 3) 
RAMR PR 
influences 
decision on 
wether to 
intervene on 
patients with 
high 
expected 
mortality;  
Patients 
referred 
from NY had 
a were 
sicker; ↑ 
average 
yearly 
volume of 
referrals 
from NY, 
while other 
referrals ↓, 
From 1989 
MR among 
NY referrals 
↑ than from 
other states 
or Ohio. 
A smaller 
percentage 
of patients 
from NY 
recieved 
CABG 
surgery 
outside of 
NY.(from 
12.5% to 
11.3%). After 
PR was 
introduced, 
the odds of 
an older 
patient with 
AMI to 
recieve 
surgery 
increased 
significantly  
high-
mortality 
hospitals 
operated on 
slightly less 
high-risk 
patients 
(25% 
decrease in 
expected 
mortality) 
59% of 
cardiologists 
found it 
more or 
much more 
difficult to 
found a 
surgeon to 
operate on a 
severly ill  
patient; 66% 
of cardiac 
surgeons 
were less or 
much less 
willing to 
operate on 
severly ill 
patients 
(compared to 
3 years 
earlier 
Majorities 
show 
concern with 
surgeons 
refusing 
high-risk 
patients,  
that high risk 
patients 
might be 
shifted to 
safety-net 
hospitals;  
Before PR 
was 
introduced, 
white 
patients 
were more 
likely to 
recieve 
CABG than 
black 
patients. In 
the 9 years 
following 
the first PR, 
the racial 
disparities 
were wider. 
Then it got 
back to pre-
PR level. 
effect - -- - --- --- + - - - +/- 
NY=New York; Penn=Pennsylvania; Mass=Massachusetts; IL= Illinios;sno= snowballing; sys=systematic review; ITS=Interrupted time series; Q=survey or interview; 
C=cohort study; CC=case-control study; DID=Difference-in-Difference Analysis; CBA= Controlled before-after study; Case= case report; BA=before-after design; 
Pat=patient; Sur=surgeon; Hos=hospital; RAMR=risk-adjusted mortality rate 
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Appendix A: Search terms 
Table 3: search terms according to PICO framework 
P(atient)=target 
group 
I(intervention) C(omparison) O(utcome) 
surg* 
consultant* 
doctor* 
physiscian* 
 
OR 
known public 
reporting systems: 
 
New York 
hospital compare 
Medicare compare 
California 
Massachusetts 
Pennsylvania 
Cleveland 
Quality counts 
CAHPS 
HEDIS 
New Jersey 
Florida 
Vermont  
Virginia 
ranking 
report card* 
public report* 
public disclosure 
score card* 
quality report* 
public release 
outcome* 
league table 
publication 
publishing 
mortality 
information service 
information 
dissemination 
access to information 
measurement 
health care quality 
quality control 
statistics 
scoring system 
outcome assessment 
mortality rate 
mandatory reporting 
public reporting 
performance 
measurement 
system 
benchmarking 
indicator 
compare 
score 
rank* 
rate  
metric evaluation 
 
not included quality 
perfom* 
incentive 
impact 
consequence 
result 
quality control 
health impact 
assessment 
program* impact 
motivation 
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Appendix B: Search strategy 
 
 Embase Classic and Embase 15.7. 405 results  
1 consultant/ or surgeon/ or surgery/  
2 (New York adj3 Cardiac adj3 Report*) or hospital compare or medicare compare or 
California State Report Card or Massachusetts Health Quality or (Pennsylvania adj3 
surg*)or  (New York adj5 surg*) or Cleveland Health Quality Choice or (HCFA adj3 
surg*)  or QualityCounts or CAHPS or HEDIS or (new jersey adj 3 surg*) or (florida 
adj3 surg*) or (vermont adj3 surg*) or  (virginia adj3 surg*) 
3 1 or 2  
4 information service/ or information dissemination/ or mandatory reporting/ or access 
to information/ or public reporting.mp. or public disclosure.mp. or public release.mp. 
or publication/ or publishing 
5 Quality indicators, health care/ or Quality assurance, health care/ or Quality 
improvement/ or performance measurement system/ or health care quality/ or 
quality control/ or quality control/ or health care quality/ or report card* or scoring 
system/ or score card* or quality report* or outcome assessment/ or outcome*or 
league table*or mortality/ or mortality rate* or Quality Assurance.mp. or total quality 
management/ or performance measurement system/ or transparency or 
benchmarking or inform* or indicator*or compar*or score*or rank*or rat* or 
measure*or report*or release* or assess* or card*or metric* or evaluat* 
6 3 and 4 and 5 
7 incentive or impact or health impact assessment/ or program impact/ or 
consequence or result or motivation/or performance measurement system/ 
8 6 and 7 
9 limits 1980-today, human, english 
  
  
 Ovid MEDLINE(R) In-Process & Other Non-Indexed Citations, Ovid 
MEDLINE(R) Daily, Ovid MEDLINE(R) and Ovid OLDMEDLINE(R) 1946 to 
Present 15.7. 256 results 
1 consultants/ or surgeons/ or physicians/ or General Surgery/ 
2 (New York adj3 Cardiac adj3 Report$) or hospital compare or medicare compare or 
California State Report Card or Massachusetts Health Quality or (Pennsylvania adj3 
surg$)or  (New York adj3 surg$) or Cleveland Health Quality Choice or (HCFA adj3 
surg$)  or QualityCounts or CAHPS or HEDIS or (new jersey adj3 surg$) or (florida 
adj3 surg$) or (vermont adj3 surg$) or  (virginia adj3 surg$) 
3 1 or 2 
4 (public report$ or public disclos$ or public release or publication or publishing or 
information service or information dissemination or access to information).mp. or 
Consumer Participation/ or Public Participation/ or publications/ [mp=title, abstract, 
original title, name of substance word, subject heading word, keyword heading 
word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease supplementary concept 
word, unique identifier] 
5 ((((Outcome.mp. or Quality Assurance, Health Care/ or Health Care Quality 
Assessment/ or Health Care Quality Assurance.mp. or Healthcare Quality 
Assessment/ or Healthcare Quality Assurance/ or Quality Assessment, Health Care/ 
or Quality Assessment, Healthcare/ or Quality Assurance, Healthcare/ or Quality 
Control/ or Quality Improvement/ or Quality Indicators, Health Care/ or Quality 
Indicators/ or Quality of Healthcare/ or Task Performance.mp.) and Analysis/) or 
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Task Performance/ or Task Performance, Analysis/ or Health Impact Assessment/ 
or Outcome.mp.) and Process Assessment/) or Assessment, Outcomes/ or 
Outcome Measures/ or Outcome Studies/ or Outcomes Assessment/ or Outcomes 
Research/ or ranking.mp. or report card$.mp. or score card$.mp. or quality 
report$.mp. or outcome$.mp. or league table$.mp. or mortality.mp. or 
measurement.mp. or quality control.mp. or scoring system$.mp. or mortality 
rate$.mp. or inform$.mp. or indicator$.mp. or compar$.mp. or score$.mp. or 
rank$.mp. or rat$.mp. or measure$.mp. or report$.mp. or release$.mp. or 
public$.mp. or publish$.mp. or assess$.mp. or card$.mp. or metric$.mp. or 
evaluat$.mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject 
heading word, keyword heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare 
disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier] 
6 3 and 4 and 5 
7 motivation/ or incentive.mp. or impact.mp. or consequence.mp. or result.mp. or 
performance.mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance word, subject 
heading word, keyword heading word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare 
disease supplementary concept word, unique identifier] 
8 6 and 7 
9 limit 8 to (english language and humans and yr="1980 -Current") 
  
  
 EconLit 15.7.   49 results  
1 (New York adj3 Cardiac adj3 Report$) or hospital compare or medicare compare or 
California State Report Card or Massachusetts Health Quality or (Pennsylvania adj3 
surg$)or  (New York adj3 surg$) or Cleveland Health Quality Choice or (HCFA adj3 
surg$)  or QualityCounts or CAHPS or HEDIS or (new jersey adj3 surg$) or (florida 
adj3 surg$) or (vermont adj3 surg$) or  (virginia adj3 surg$) 
2 (Consultant* or surge*).mp. [mp=heading words, abstract, title, country as subject] 
3 (public report$ or public disclos$ or public release or publication or publishing or 
information service or information dissemination or (access to adj3 
information)).mp. [mp=heading words, abstract, title, country as subject] 
4 (Quality indicator* or Quality assurance or Quality improvement or health care 
quality or quality control or report card* or scoring system* or score card* or quality 
report* or outcome assessment* or outcome*or league table*or mortality or mortality 
rate* or Quality Assurance or transparency or benchmarking or inform* or 
indicator*or compar*or score*or rank*or rat* or measure*or report*or release* or 
assess* or card*or metric* or evaluat*).mp. [mp=heading words, abstract, title, 
country as subject] 
5 2 and 3 and 4 
6 1 or 5 
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Appendix C: Result of quality appraisal 
 
Name    
A
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a
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a
n
d
 t
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In
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M
e
th
o
d
 a
n
d
 d
a
ta
 
S
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m
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D
a
ta
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a
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s
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E
th
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s
 a
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d
 b
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s
 
F
in
d
in
g
s
/r
e
s
u
lt
s
 
T
ra
n
s
fe
rr
a
b
ili
ty
 
Im
p
lic
a
ti
o
n
s
 a
n
d
 u
s
e
fu
ln
e
s
s
 
T
o
ta
l 
C
o
m
m
e
n
t 
Apolito et al. 2008 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 34 Further 
research areas 
not specified 
Bridgewater 
et al.  
2007 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 35  
Burack 1999 4 3 4 4 4 2 4 4 2 31  
Chassin et 
al.  
2002 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 4 4 19 Only case 
study-part of 
the article 
taken into 
account 
Dranove et 
al.  
2003 3 4 4 2 4 2 3 4 2 28  
Dziuban et 
al. 
1994 3 2 3 3 2 1 3 4 2 23  
Glance et al.  2007 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 35  
Hannan et al. 1997 a 4 3 4 4 4 2 4 4 2 31  
Hannan et al. 1997 b 4 3 4 4 2 2 3 4 4 30  
Jha et.al. 2006 2 3 2 4 3 1 3 3 4 25 only part about 
surgeons 
ceasing to 
practice 
considered 
Joynt et.a. 2012 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 34  
Khan et.al. 2007 4 2 4 4 4 2 4 4 3 31  
Kolstad 2013 2 4 4 3 4 2 3 4 3 29  
Maytham et 
al. 
2010 3 2 4 3 4 3 4 3 3 29 only 50% 
response rate, 
second survey 
has more 
participants 
Moscucci et 
al.  
2005 4 2 4 4 4 2 4 4 3 31  
Narins et.at. 2005 4 3 4 4 3 2 3 3 3 29  
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Omoigui 
et.at. 
1996 4 2 4 4 4 2 3 3 3 29 Limited 
generalisability 
since they only 
looked at one 
hospital 
Peterson et. 
al. 
1998 4 3 4 4 4 2 3 4 3 31  
Schneider 
et.al. 
1996 4 2 3 4 3 1 3 4 3 27 statistical 
significance 
not reported 
for all 
measures 
Sherman 
et.al. 
2013 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 3 31 no exposure 
(not a PR 
state) 
Werner et.al.  2005 4 3 4 4 4 2 4 4 3 32  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
